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CASE COMMENTS
MANDATORY INJUNCTION: AS A REMEDY OF A REVER-
SIONER FOR WASTE COMMITTED BY A TENANT
The defendant leased a shop on the ground floor of plaintiffs'
hotel building, covenanting to alter the frontage only with the plain-
tiffs' written consent. Without such permission the defendant made
changes which cheapened the character and appearance of the prem-
ises. Held, injunction granted restraining further alterations and
commanding restoration within the eight-year remainder of the
term. The dissent urged that the plaintiffs were not required to
wait until the expiration of the lease, but were entitled to a manda-
tory injunction affording immediate restitution of the original
frontage2
Comparatively early in the history of modern English chancery
came the first reported instance of a mandatory injunction,' a case
in which the chancellor, not being content with supplying the usual
restraint against plowing up ancient pasture lands, ordered the
defendant to show cause why he should not lay down again that
which he had plowed. Eventually the courts of equity came to the
conclusion that the injunction was directed at the wrongful condition
-not the circumstances giving rise to the wrong,' though they be
affirmative or negative-and that ordering an affirmative act was not
inconsistent with remedying a wrongful condition,' until at present
the power of equity to grant mandatory injunctions is generally
recognized.'
Lexington and Fortieth Corp. et al. v. Calaghan et al.; Same v.
Lexington Avenue and 40th St., Inc., 281 N. Y. 526, 24 N. E. (2d) 316
(1939). Affirmed 25 N. E. (2d) 147 (1940).
Ibid at 318.
'Rolls contra Miller, 21 Eng. Rep. 149, Tothill 144 (112 Pasture,
1639).
'See generally 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (2d ed. 1919)
sections 491, 492; Clark, Equity (1919) section 70.
'Keys v. Alligood, 178 N. C. 16, 100 S. E. 113 (1919).
"Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Webster Sand, Gravel and Con-
struction Co., 132 La. 1051, 62 So. 140(1913); Coombs v. Lenox
Realty Co., 111 Me. 178, 88 Atl. 477(1913); Harrington v. McCarthy,
169 Mass. 492, 48 N. E. 278 (1897); Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N. Y.
179, 15 N. E. 67(1888).
As late as 1870 (in Lexington City National Bank v. Guynn, 69
Ky. 486) the Kentucky Court of Appeals held injunction to be merely
a preventive remedy, the original code provision allowing it to be
used only to restrain a defendant from action (Mason v. Byrely,
26 Ky. L. Rep. 487, 491, 84 S. W. 767. 770 (1904)). Under the Act
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In the principal case the jurisdiction of the court to grant this
type of remedy is not challenged; the issue involved relates rather to
whether the affirmative act of restoration should be immediately
required of the defendant, or whether he should be granted the
remainder of the lease term in which to restore the frontage to its
original condition. Where this question has been discussed the
weight of judicial opinion has emphasized the importance of the time
element, indicating that where the marketability of the premises
might be impaired due to waste and breach of a covenant not to alter
that the holder of the reversion is entitled to immediate relief.7 In the
case of Bass v. Metropolitan West Side Elevated Railroad Company,'
where the defendant railroad had a long time lease of premises and
committed waste to make way for a track and girder, thus violating
an express covenant, immediate relief by mandatory injunction was
held to be a proper remedy. In the case of Union Trust Company v.
Georke Company,' the defendant leased premises from the plaintiff,
also leasing the adjoining location, and the complaint alleged injury
by building on the adjacent lot so as to encroach upon the plaintiff's
premises; here the court required immediate restoration by mandatory
injunction on the basis of a present injury to the reversion. As to
the reasoning behind such decisions stressing not only the injury
which will become manifest at the end of the term, but also the
present wrong, it has been suggested that:
"The reason for granting such injunctions seems to be based
on the landiord's absolute right to have the premises remain in
the condition in which they are, and the inadequacy of damages
to compensate for the invasions of that right."1
In the instant case the irreparable injury seized upon by the
majority to establish the propriety of exercising equitable jurisdic-
of 1884, however, this was changed, and by Section 271 of the present
Code it is provided that:
'When any mandatory injunction shall be granted, the order
of judgment may affirmatively direct the party enjoined to do
the act or thing required to be done."
IWoolworth Co. v. Nelson 204 Ala. 172, 85 So. 449(1920); Klie
et al. v. Von Broock et al., 56 k. J. Eq. 18, 37 Atl. 469(1897); Union
Trust Co. v. Georke Co., 105 N. J. Eq. 190, 147 Atl. 439(1929), modi-
fying 103 N. J. Eq. 159, 142 Atl. 560(1928); Hamburger & Dreyling
et al v. Settlegast et al., 62 Tex. Civ. App. 446, 131 S. W. 639(1910).
853 U. S. App. 542, 82 Fed. 857(1897). The court, by way of
explanation, said:
"The demand of the appellant for present relief against the
wrong done and intended is not met by the suggestion that, 'if
the leasehold estate should be extinguished of course the railroad
company would be a trespasser, if it did not remove its girder'.
The railroad company might abandon posssession, leaving to the
landlord the expense both of removing the girder and of recon-
structing the torn-down corner, with recourse for the outlay upon
no responsible party . .
* Supra note 7.
"5 Minn. L. Rev. 79, 80(1920).
K. L. J.--8
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tion consists in the return of the property to the landlord in a
cheapened appearance at the end of the term, but this is not accurate.
On the contrary, the true irreparable damage to the plaintiff will take
place all during the lease term, and will consist in the cheapening
influence of the changed frontage upon the whole building, the repute
of the hotel, and the commercial respectability of the adjoining store
space. This condition, if allowed to exist for eight years, would con-
tinue to have its effect for an unpredictable time after the expiration
of the term.
Granting this as true, it is submitted that if a mandatory injunc-
tion is to issue at all, it should be directed at the continuation of a
condition which now causes irreparable damage and present injury
to the landlord, and that the only way to protect this present interest
is the grant immediate restoration. From these considerations the
proposition favored by the dissent seems not only to be more authori-
tative, but also more logical and reasonable than the majority, for:
"It is no justification of an act of waste that a party will at
some future time put the premises in the same condition as they
were when the lease was made. The landlord has a right to a
continuance of the state of things as they existed when the injury
was done. HOWARD E. TRENT, JR.
REPEAL BY IMPLICATION
The county judge pro ter in Jefferson county presided at a
meeting of the fiscal court. It was objected that an appropriation
make by this court was not authorized by law and void because the
county judge pro ter could not preside at the meeting. Upon a
petition for a binding declaration of rights brought by the county
attorney the defendants contended that the legislature intended for
the pro tern judge to step into the shoes of the county judge and per-
form all of his functions including serving as a member of the fiscal
court. This contention was based on Section 1059 of the Kentucky
Statutes which provides:
"The county judge may by order entered on the order book
of the county court appoint and designate a county judge pro tern,
who shall serve at the pleasure of the county judge. . . Said
county judge pro tern shall when the county judge is absent from
office, or for any reason is made unable to perform the duties of
his office, perform any and all duties imposed by law upon the
regular county judge."'
In affirming the ruling of the lower court the Court of Appeals held
that the county judge pro tem may not preside at a meeting of the
fiscal court. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Grauman, 281 Ky. 608,
136 S. W. (2d) 1102 (1940).
" Supra notes 7 and 8.
33 Hamburger & Dreyling et al. v. Settlegast et al., supra note 7,
at 641.
'Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936) sec. 1059.
